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12 Using Reductions to Show that Problems are Not Computable

Section 11 provides two tools, Turing reductions and mapping reductions, that we can use to demonstrate that a problem is uncomputable. They are generally much easier to apply than diagonalization. Here are the important facts about reductions from Section 11.

Corollary 11.8. If $A \leq_t B$ and A is not computable, then B is not computable.

Corollary 11.15. If $A \leq_m B$ and A is not computable then B is not computable.

12.1 $p(x)\uparrow$?

Section 11 defines

NOTHLT =
$$\{(p, x) \mid p(x)\uparrow\}$$

HLT = $\{(p, x) \mid p(x)\downarrow\}$

and shows that NOTHLT \leq_t HLT. We know from Section 10 that HLT is uncomputable. Relationship NOTHLT \leq_t HLT only tells us that NOTHLT is no harder than an uncomputable problem, which tells use nothing about NOTHLT. But it is easy to turn that particular reduction around.

Theorem 12.1. HLT \leq_t NOTHLT.

Proof. The following is a Turing reduction from HLT to NOTHLT, establishing that $HLT \leq_t NOTHLT$.

"{halts(p, x): If $(p, x) \in$ NOTHLT then return 0 else

```
return 1
}"
```

By Corollary 11.8, since HLT is uncomputable, NOTHLT is also uncomputable.

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12.2 The Acceptance Problem

The acceptance problem for programs is as follows.

$$ACC = \{ (p, x) \mid p(x) \cong 1 \}.$$

Theorem 12.2. ACC is uncomputable.

Proof. It suffices to show that HLT $\leq_t ACC$. Here is a Turing reduction from HLT to ACC. It introduces a new wrinkle: it builds a program on the fly.

```
\label{eq:product} \begin{array}{l} \mbox{"}\{ \mbox{halts}(p,x) \colon \\ r = \mbox{"}\{r(z) \colon w = p(z); \mbox{ return 1} \} \mbox{"} \\ \mbox{if } (r,x) \in \mbox{ACC} \\ \mbox{ return 1} \\ \mbox{else} \\ \mbox{ return 0} \\ \mbox{} \end{array}
```

Clearly

$$\begin{array}{rcl} (r,x)\in ACC &\leftrightarrow & r(x)\cong 1 & \mbox{ by the definition of ACC} \\ &\leftrightarrow & p(x){\downarrow} & \mbox{ by the definition of } r \\ &\leftrightarrow & (p,x)\in HLT & \mbox{ by the definition of HLT} \end{array}$$

so program halts(p, x) correctly answers the question: is $(p, x) \in HLT$?

There is really no need for the full power of a Turing reduction here. Function

$$f(p, x) = ("\{r(z) : w = p(z); return 1\}", x)$$

is a mapping reduction from HLT to ACC; f is computable and, as we have just shown,

$$(p,x) \in HLT \iff f(p,x) \in ACC.$$

You should begin to recognize the brevity of mapping reductions.

12.3 Does *p* Terminate on Input 1?

We have seen the trick of creating a program on the fly. With the next reduction, we introduce another trick: make that program ignore its parameter, so that it does the same thing on all strings. To that end, define

$$T_1 = \{r \mid r(1)\downarrow\}.$$

That is, instead of asking whether a give program halts on some given string x, T_1 asks whether the program halts on input 1. That might sound easier than the Halting Problem, but it is not.

Theorem 12.3. T_1 is uncomputable.

Proof. It suffices to show that there is a mapping reduction from HLT to T_1 ; that is, we show that HLT $\leq_m T_1$. The usual way to show that something exists is to produce one, and that is what we do. The following function f is a mapping reduction from HLT to T_1 .

$$f(p, x) = "\{r(q) : w = p(x); \text{ return } 1\}"$$

Certainly, f is computable. All it does is write a program (a string) and return that program. f does not run the program that it builds. Notice that program r(q) runs program p on input x, but ignores the result. Also notice that r(q) ignores q; r does the same thing regardless of the parameter that is passed to it.

Let's refer to program " $\{r(q) : w = p(x); \text{ return } 1\}$ " as $r_{p,x}$, acknowledging the fact that p and x are built into r, and you cannot write $r_{p,x}$ until you

know what p and x are. Notice that

$$(p, x) \in \operatorname{HLT} \rightarrow p(x) \downarrow$$
 by the definition of HLT
 $\rightarrow r_{p,x}(q) \downarrow$ for every q by the definition of $r_{p,x}$
 $\rightarrow r_{p,x}(1) \downarrow$
 $\rightarrow r_{p,x} \in T_1$ by the definition of T_1

and

$r_{p,x} \in T_1$	\rightarrow	$r_{p,x}(1)\downarrow$	by the definition of T_1
	\rightarrow	$p(x) \downarrow$	by the definition of $r_{p,x}$
	\rightarrow	$(p, x) \in \mathrm{HLT}$	by the definition of HLT

Putting those together:

$$(p, x) \in \text{HLT} \leftrightarrow r_{p,x} \in T_1.$$

Since $f(p, x) = r_{p,x}$, that is exactly the requirement for f to be a mapping reduction from HLT to T_1 .

 \diamond

12.4 Does *p* Terminate on Input 2?

Define

$$T_2 = \{r \mid r(2)\downarrow\}.$$

It should be obvious how to modify the proof of Theorem 12.3 to show that $\operatorname{HLT} \leq_m T_2$. But we already know that T_1 is uncomputable, so showing that $T_1 \leq_m T_2$ is enough to show that T_2 is uncomputable. Let's do that.

Theorem 12.4. $T_1 \leq_m T_2$.

Proof. All we need to do is to transform a question of whether a program a halts on input 1 into an equivalent question of whether another program b_a halts on input 2. That is easy to do: define

$$b_a = "\{b(q): \text{ return } a(1)\}".$$

Clearly,

$$a(1)\downarrow \leftrightarrow b_a(2)\downarrow$$

That is,

$$a \in T_1 \leftrightarrow b_a \in T_2.$$

So $f(a) = b_a$ is mapping reduction from T_1 to T_2 . \diamondsuit

12.5 The Everything Problem for Programs

Define

$$ALL = \{ p \mid \forall x(p(x)\downarrow) \}.$$

That is, ALL is the following decision problem.

Input. Program p.

Question. Does p halt on every input?

Theorem 12.5. ALL is uncomputable.

Proof. It certainly is not enough to argue that an algorithm to solve ALL would need to try every input. That is nonsense. Suppose stopper is a program that clearly halts on every input.

stopper(x)return 1 $}"$

Do you need to try it on every input to be sure that it stops on every input? Of course not. Consider another program that clearly loops forever on all inputs, such as the following.

```
"{looper(x)
while(1)
do nothing
}"
```

You can see from the structure of the program that it loops forever on all inputs. What we need to show is that there is no program R that takes *any* program p as an input and tells you whether p stops on all inputs.

The proof is a mapping reduction from T_1 to ALL. Define

$$r_p = "\{r(q) : \text{ return } p(1)\}'$$

 $f(p) = r_p$

Since r_p ignores its parameter q, it should be clear from the definition of r_p that

$$p(1)\downarrow \leftrightarrow \forall q(r_p(q)\downarrow)$$

That is,

$$p \in T_1 \leftrightarrow r_p \in ALL$$

which means that $f(p) = r_p$ is a mapping reduction from T_1 to ALL.

 \diamond

12.6 Complementation and Computability

It is easy to relate the computability of language S and its complement, language \overline{S} .

Theorem 12.6. Suppose S is a language over alphabet Σ . If S is a computable then \overline{S} is also computable.

Proof. Suppose that program p computes S. That is, p stops on every input and, for every $x \in \Sigma^*$,

$$p(x) \cong 1 \iff x \in S.$$

The following program computes \overline{S} by flipping answers from 1 to 0 and from 0 to 1.

```
  \{ Sbar(x): \\ if p(x) == 1 \\ return 0 \\ else \\ return 1 \\ \}"
```

In fact, it is obvious that Theorem 12.6 extends to an equivalence.

Theorem 12.7. S is computable if and only if \overline{S} is computable.

12.7 Rice's Theorem

Excluding the proof of Theorem 12.1, you should notice similarities in the above proofs. Excepting only HLT, all of the problems that we looked at are questions about programs, and those questions only depend on what the program does when you run it.

Can we prove a general theorem that takes the similarities of those proofs into account, so that those theorems all become corollaries of the general theorem? Such a theorem would say something like, "It is not computable to determine whether a program has a property that is based solely on what that program does when you run it." We can do something like that, but it is much too vague. The first step we need to make is to find a precise definition of what it means for a set of programs to depend only on what a program does when you run it.

12.7.1 Definitions and Some Obvious Theorems

Definition 12.8. Programs p and q are *equivalent* if $p(x) \cong q(x)$ for every x. That is, the result of p(x) is the same as the result of q(x) for every x. We write $p \approx q$ to mean that p and q are equivalent programs.

Suppose that L is a set of programs over alphabet Σ . Define $\overline{L} = \Sigma^* - L$.

Definition 12.9. *L* is *nontrivial* if $L \neq \{\}$ and $L \neq \Sigma^*$. That is, neither *L* nor \overline{L} is empty.

The following theorem is obvious.

Theorem 12.10. *L* is nontrivial if and only if \overline{L} is nontrivial.

The next definition is critical to what we are trying to do. Read it and make sure that you understand what it says.

Definition 12.11. Suppose L is a set of programs. Say that L respects equivalence provided, for every pair of equivalent programs p and q, either p and q are both in L or p and q are both in \overline{L} . That is, L must classify any two equivalent programs the same way; they are either both in L or both not in L.

The following is immediate from Definition 12.11.

Theorem 12.12. *L* respects equivalence if and only if \overline{L} respects equivalence.

Definition 12.13. Define

 $LOOP = "{LOOP(x) : loop forever}"$

to be a program that loops forever on all inputs.

12.7.2 Rice's Theorem

Our goal is to prove a result called Rice's Theorem, which states that every nontrivial set of programs that respects equivalence is uncomputable. We will do that using a lemma and a corollary to the lemma.

Lemma 12.14. If L is a nontrivial set of programs that respects equivalence, and LOOP $\notin L$, then HLT $\leq_m L$. (That is, L is at least as difficult as uncomputable set HLT.)

Proof.

1. Suppose that L is a nontrivial set of programs that respects equivalence and where LOOP $\notin L$.

Known variables:	L
Know (1):	L is a set of programs.
Know (2):	L is nontrivial.
Know (3):	L respects equivalence.
Know (4):	$LOOP \notin L.$
Goal:	$\mathrm{HLT} \leq_m L.$

2. Since L is nontrivial, there must be some program that is a member of L. Ask someone else to provide one. Let's call it Y.

Known variables:	L, Y
Know (1):	L is a set of programs.
Know (2):	L is nontrivial.
Know (3):	L respects equivalence.
Know (4):	$LOOP \notin L.$
Know (5):	$Y \in L.$
Goal:	$\mathrm{HLT} \leq_m L.$

3. For any given p and x, define $r_{p,x}$ as follows.

Notice that, for arbitrary p and x,

$$\begin{array}{lll} (p,x) \in \mathrm{HLT} & \to & p(x) \downarrow & & \text{from the definition of HLT} \\ & \to & \forall z(r_{p,x}(z) \cong Y(z)) & & \text{from the definition of } r_{p,x} \\ & \to & r_{p,x} \approx Y \\ & \to & r_{p,x} \in L & & \text{since } L \text{ respects equivalence} \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{lll} (p,x) \not\in \operatorname{HLT} & \to & p(x) \uparrow & & \text{by the definition of HLT} \\ & \to & \forall z(r_{p,x}(z) \uparrow) & & \text{by the definition of } r_{p,x} \\ & \to & r_{p,x} \approx \operatorname{LOOP} \\ & \to & r_{p,x} \not\in L & & \text{since LOOP} \notin L \text{ and } L \text{ respects equivalence} \end{array}$$

Known variables:	$L, Y, r_{p,x}$
Know (1):	L is a set of programs.
Know (2):	L is nontrivial.
Know (3):	L respects equivalence.
Know (4):	$LOOP \notin L.$
Know (5):	$Y \in L.$
Know (6):	$\forall p \forall x ((p, x) \in \operatorname{HLT} \to r_{p, x} \in L)$
Know (7):	$\forall p \forall x ((p, x) \notin \text{HLT} \to r_{p, x} \notin L)$
Goal:	$\operatorname{HLT} \leq_m L.$

4. Our mapping reduction from function HLT to L is:

$$f(p,x) = r_{p,x}.$$

Clearly, f is computable, since it only needs to write down program $r_{p,x}$. Putting facts (6) and (7) together,

$$(p,x) \in \operatorname{HLT} \leftrightarrow r_{p,x} \in L.$$

So f is a mapping reduction from HLT to L.

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Corollary 12.15. If L is a nontrivial set of programs that respects equivalence, where LOOP $\notin L$, then L is not computable.

Proof. That follows immediately from Lemma 12.14, corollary 11.15 and the fact that HLT is uncomputable.

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Theorem 12.16. (Rice's Theorem) If L is a nontrivial set of programs that respects equivalence, then L is not computable.

Proof. There are two cases: either LOOP $\notin L$ or LOOP $\in L$.

If LOOP $\notin L$, then Theorem 12.16 follows immediately from Corollary 12.15.

So consider the case where $\text{LOOP} \in L$. Then $\text{LOOP} \notin \overline{L}$. By Theorems 12.10 and 12.12, \overline{L} is nontrivial and \overline{L} respects equivalence. So \overline{L} meets the requirements of Corollary 12.15. We conclude that, in this case, \overline{L} is uncomputable. By Theorem 12.7, L is also uncomputable.

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12.8 Examples Using Rice's theorem

12.8.1 Example: T_1 is Uncomputable

Recall that we defined

$$T_1 = \{r \mid r(1)\downarrow\}.$$

Let's reprove that T_1 is uncomputable using Rice's Theorem.

Theorem 12.17. T_1 is uncomputable.

Proof. Since some programs halt on input 1 and some don't, T_1 is nontrivial. Suppose that p and q are two equivalent programs. Then

$p \in T_1$	\leftrightarrow	$p(1)\downarrow$	by the definition of T_1
	\leftrightarrow	$q(1) \downarrow$	since $p \approx q$
	\leftrightarrow	$q \in T_1$	by the definition of T_1

So T_1 respects equivalence. By Rice's Theorem, T_1 is uncomputable. \diamond

12.8.2 Example: Is L(p) finite?

Define

FINITE = $\{p \mid L(p) \text{ is a finite set}\}.$

FINITE is the following decision problem.

Input. A program *p*.

Question. Is L(p) finite? That is, is $\{x \mid p(x) \cong 1\}$ a finite set?

Notice that FINITE is not a finite set! It is a set of programs. For every computable set S, there are infinitely many programs that solve S. (You can make infinitely many variations on a program without changing the set that it decides.) So there are infinitely many programs p where $L(p) = \{\}$, and all of those are members of FINITE.

Theorem 12.18. FINITE is uncomputable.

Proof. FINITE is nontrivial. Some programs answer 1 on only finitely many inputs, and some answer 1 on infinitely many inputs.

Suppose that p and q are two equivalent programs. Then

$$p \in \text{FINITE} \iff L(p) \text{ is a finite set}$$

 $\iff L(q) \text{ is a finite set} \quad \text{since } p \approx q$
 $\iff q \in FINITE$

So FINITE respects equivalence. By Rice's Theorem, FINITE is uncomputable.

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12.8.3 Example: Is $L(p) = \{\}$?

Define

EMPTY =
$$\{p \mid L(p) = \{\}\}$$
.

EMPTY is not an empty set! It is the following decision problem.

Input. A program *p*.

Question. Is it the case that $L(p) = \{\}$? That is, are there no inputs x on which p stops and answers 1?

Theorem 12.19. EMPTY is uncomputable.

Proof. EMPTY is clearly nontrivial. It also respects equivalence.

$$p \in \text{EMPTY} \quad \leftrightarrow \quad L(p) = \{\}$$
$$\leftrightarrow \quad L(q) = \{\} \qquad \text{since } p \approx q$$
$$\leftrightarrow \quad q \in EMPTY$$

By Rice's Theorem, EMPTY is uncomputable.

 \diamond

12.9 Are p and q equivalent?

Define

$$EQUIV = \{(p,q) \mid p \approx q\}.$$

Rice's Theorem has nothing to say about EQUIV because EQUIV is not a set of programs. It is a set of ordered pairs of programs. Nevertheless, we can show that EQUIV is uncomputable.

Theorem 12.20. EQUIV is uncomputable.

Proof. Define

NEVERHALT = $\{p \mid \forall x(p(x)\uparrow)\}.$

NEVERHALT is a nontrivial set of programs that respects equivalence. Rice's theorem tells us that NEVERHALT is uncomputable. An equivalent definition is:

NEVERHALT = $\{p \mid p \approx \text{LOOP}\}.$

Function f defined by

$$f(p) = (p, \text{LOOP})$$

is a mapping reduction from NEVERHALT to EQUIV, since

$$p \in \text{NEVERHALT} \leftrightarrow p \approx \text{LOOP}$$

 $\leftrightarrow (p, \text{LOOP}) \in \text{EQUIV}$

12.10 *K*

Define

$$K = \{ p \mid p(p) \downarrow \}.$$

K is a set of programs, but it does not respect equivalence. Let's try to show that K respects equivalence to see where the proof breaks down.

$$p \in K \quad \leftrightarrow \quad p(p) \downarrow$$
$$\quad \leftrightarrow \quad q(p) \downarrow \quad \text{ since } p \approx q$$

But what q does on input p is irrelevant to determining whether $q \in K$. All that matters is what q does on input q.

Nevertheless, we can show:

Theorem 12.21. *K* is uncomputable.

Proof. Rice's theorem is not a help here. But it suffices to show that $\text{HLT} \leq_m K$. For arbitrary p and x, define $r_{p,x}$ as follows.

Notice that $r_{p,x}$ ignores its parameter, z. It just runs p(x). It is evident that

$$(p, x) \in HLT \quad \rightarrow \quad p(x) \downarrow \\ \rightarrow \quad \forall z(r_{p,x}(z) \downarrow) \\ \rightarrow \quad r_{p,x}(r_{p,x}) \downarrow) \\ \rightarrow \quad r_{p,x} \in K$$

and

$$(p, x) \notin HLT \rightarrow p(x)\uparrow \\ \rightarrow \forall z(r_{p,x}(z)\uparrow) \\ \rightarrow r_{p,x}(r_{p,x})\uparrow) \\ \rightarrow r_{p,x} \notin K$$

which tells us that

 $f(p,x) = r_{p,x}$

is a mapping reduction from HLT to K.

12.11 Concrete examples

Without concrete examples, it can be easy to believe that our theorems about problems being uncomputable are only of abstract, mathematical significance, and have no bearing on the real world. So let's look at some concrete examples to see that the real world is not immune to mathematical theorems.

12.11.1 The 3n+1 problem

The 3n + 1 problem concerns an infinite collection of sequences of integers. Select a positive integer n to start a sequence. Follow it by n/2 if n is even and by 3n + 1 if n is odd. Stop the sequence when it reaches 1. The 3n + 1sequence starting with 9 is (9, 28, 14, 7, 22, 11, 34, 17, 52, 26, 13, 40, 20, 10, 5, 16, 8, 4, 2, 1).

It is not obvious that the 3n + 1 sequence stops for all starting values. It is conceivable that it gets into a cycle. It is also conceivable that, for some starting values, the numbers in the 3n + 1 sequence keep getting larger and larger, without bound. In fact, nobody knows whether every 3n + 1 sequence is finitely long. But we can always make a conjecture.

Conjecture 12.22. The 3n+1 sequence is finitely long for every start value.

Look at the following program.

$$"\{ test(n): i = n \\ while i > 1 \\ if i is even \\ i = i/2 \\ else \\ i = 3i + 1 \\ \}"$$

Can you tell whether test is in ALL? (That is, does test halt on all inputs x?) If test is in ALL, then Conjecture 12.22 is true. If not, then Conjecture 12.22 is false. If you can write a computer program that solves ALL, then that program tells you whether the above conjecture is true.

But that seems unreasonable; a computer should not be able to resolve a deep conjecture like that. The fact that ALL is uncomputable keeps you from solving a deep conjecture by running a computer program that seems to have nothing to do with the conjecture.

12.11.2 Does program *p* test whether a number is prime?

Now suppose that you are serving as a grader for a computer programming course. One of the assignments for that course asks students to write a program that reads an integer n > 1 and tells whether n is prime. As grader, you are tasked with determining whether each submission is correct, with the sole criterion for correctness being that the program correctly determines whether n is prime for every integer n. (In the programming language being used, integers can be arbitrarily large, so you can't try the program on a finite range of integers to decide whether it works.)

To make sure that you are ready, you write your own program p to tell if a number is prime. Now, given a student submission q, the problem is to determine whether $q \approx p$. But that is uncomputable! Could that possibly be a problem? Suppose that a particularly devious student submits the following program.

```
 \begin{array}{l} & \| \{q(n) \\ i = n \\ & \text{while } i > 1 \\ & \text{if } i \text{ is even} \\ & i = i/2 \\ & \text{else} \\ & i = 3i+1 \\ i = 2 \\ & \text{while } i < n \\ & \text{if } n \mod i = 0 \\ & \text{return } 0 \\ & i = i+1 \\ & \text{return } 1 \\ \} \end{array}
```

You notice that, if Conjecture 12.22 is true, the submitted program q is correct. But if Conjecture 12.22 is false, then there are values n on which q loops forever, meaning that q is incorrect. In order to grade q according to the grading criterion, you must determine whether Conjecture 12.22 is true!

12.11.3 Goldbach's conjecture

The following conjecture is due to Goldbach.

Goldbach's Conjecture 12.23 Every even integer that is greater than 2 is the sum of two prime integers.

For example, 4 = 2 + 2, 6 = 3 + 3, 8 = 3 + 5, 10 = 5 + 5, etc. Nobody knows whether Goldbach's conjecture is true, and it appears to be a very difficult nut to crack. But we can write the following program, which contains an infinite loop that checks, for each even number n, whether there are two prime numbers whose sum is n. If it finds an even number n that is not the sum of two prime numbers, it stops. Otherwise, it loops forever.

```
"{goldbach()

n = 4

while(1)

i = 2

found = 0

while found == 0 and i < n

if i is prime and n - i is prime

found = 1

i = i + 1

if found == 0

return 0

n = n + 2
}"
```

To answer Goldbach's conjecture, all you need to do is ask whether program goldbach ever stops. You can ask whether it is in ALL or in T_1 or in a variety of languages because goldbach ignores its input.

Goldbach's conjecture is another deep conjecture that could be resolved by running a computer program if ALL or T_1 is computable. The fact that no such computer program exists should come as no surprise.

12.11.4 Compilers

Compilers for programming languages offer warnings when you do something suspicious (some more than others). One warning that would be nice would be whether the program can ever loop forever. Yet, no compilers offer such warnings. Can you say why not?

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